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THE INEFFICIENCY OF THE AMERICAN JURY.
N OTHING else in Anglo Saxon law has ever made such an
iappeal to the popular imagination as the common law jury.
For centuries it has been the subject of the most extravagant pan-
egyrics. It has been considered the bulwark of liberty, the safe-
guard of life and property. Everything connected with it has en-
joyed its share of praise. Even the number twelve has been serious-
ly referred to'as evidence of its sacred character, for Lord CoYX
says of the jury:- "It seemeth to me that the law justly delighteth
herself in the number of twelve jurors for the matter of fact, for
is that number not much suggested in Holy Writ, as twelve apostles,
twelve stones, twelve tribes, etc."
But great as has been the reverence for the jury system in Eng-
land, its native land, we in the United States have placed it on a
still higher and more enduring pedestal, for by means of our con-
stitutions, state and national, we have made it an inalienable herit-
age of the people themselves.
Perhaps it is a natural consequence of this almost superstitious
reverence for the jury as an' institution, that its real function and
true purposes have often been lost sight of. Excessive zeal for its
protection has seriously interfered with its practical usefulness. It
has tended to become a fetish, and has often needed nothing so
much as to be saved from its -friends.
What is proposed in the present article is to show that in attempt-
ing to preserve the independence of the jury in its exclusive juris-
diction over questions of fact, the people and the courts in most
American jurisdictions have departed from the common law prac-
tice and have introduced a principle calculated to undermine the
very institution which they wish to strengthen. That is to say,
through the rules prohibiting judges from commenting on the
weight of the evidence, juries tend to become irresponsible, ver-
dicts tend to become matters of chance, and the intricacy of pro-
cedure, with its cost, delay and liability to error, has increased so
much as to threaten popular respect for courts of justice.
The distinguishing feature of the jury as it developed in England
and as it came to us, was the restriction of its jurisdiction to ques-
tions of fact. FoasYTr, in his careful examination of the origin
of the English jury, presents very convincing evidence that such
a jury was not known in Anglo-Saxon times and that it did not
find its prototype in the early juries of the continent. For, as he
points out, the Scandanavian, German and Anglo-Saxon analogues
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were tribunals charged with the duty of determining both the law
and the facts of the case. Probably in a large majority of the cases
which arose in tribal days the law was so simple and the legal con-
sequence following from the facts so definite and clear that there
was no need for a separation of the two, but nevertheless the jurors
not only found the facts but also determined and applied the law,
and were thus both judge and jury combined.
1
The weakness of such a tribunal lies in its want of technical
knowledge. Men temporarily called from the ordinary affairs of
life, untrained in the law, are incapable of performing the functions
of judges in any but the most primitive communities. Hence the
popularly constituted continental juries passed away and the judicial
power naturally became lodged in courts with a permanent personnel
of trained lawyers.
But it has been asserted by the same learned writer that in Eng-
land, on the contrary, the limited jurisdiction of the juries preserved
them from such a fate, for while laws always grow more intricate
with the development of social institutions, facts do not greatly
change their nature, and twelve casual citizens may be said to be
as well qualified to pass upon an issue of fact in the reign of George
V as were twelve such citizens in the reign of Edward III. It is
doubtful, however, whether this- is strictly true. Life was simple
when the jury system was young, but with the steadily growing com-
plexity of society and social practices, the facts which enter into
legal controversies have become much more complex. Perhaps it
may be said that the growth of education has kept the average
juryman abreast of the times in this regard, and the modern facts
are no more difficult for the modern jury than were the ancient facts
for the juries of olden times. But there i's no necessary relation
between mental power and the quantity of accumulated information,
and the widespread study of books has had only the smallest influ-
ence in improving the quality of the human mind.
"However, if it be conceded that the jury is as competent today
as it wa five centuries ago, that would not be sufficient to fully
justify its persistence. The crude institutions of primitive society
cannot eipect to survive amid the increasing exactions of more
refined and more critical times unless they can meet the requirements.
More efficiency is the demand of each successive generation, and this
has usuallybeen found through specialization. To get the best re-
sults in any line one must employ those who have had special train-
ing in it. Even so conservative a profession as the law has not
1Forsyth: History of Trial by jury..
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escaped the universal social struggle toward specialized efficiency.
Why, then, has not the cumbersome common law jury, with 
its
tedious procedure, its loose organization, its irresponsible 
personnel,
its blundering methods, and its unsatisfactory results, been 
long since
discarded, in favor of an expert and well trained agency 
for sifting
evidence and finding facts? Why did not the judge, with 
his better
training, broader experience and more efficient methods 
take over
the duties of the jury?
In considering this question it is to be noted, in the 
first place,
that the jury has always been considered not only a finder 
of facts,
but a bulwark against the arbitrary power of judges. 
The English
people feared the courts. They were willing to put up 
with costs,
delays and unsatisfactory service if thereby they could 
check the
encroachments of judicial authority.
BEN AM gives a curious emphasis to this idea in his 
definition
of a jury. "Taken in its most extensive sense", he says, 
"a jury
may be defined as an occasional body of non-professional 
and non-
official judges, employed to constitute and apply a check to 
the power
of a professional or official judge, or body of judges".
2 In this
view the jury is a social, not merely a legal institution. 
It is a
palladium of popular liberties. For this purpose it must 
be, of the
people, bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh. It must 
be fear-
less and defiant of official despotism. If it is that, it serves 
its great
social and political end. If the rights of a free people, 
seriously
threatened by the tyranny of the king's judges, can be safeguarded
by the institution of a jury, complaints of its inefficiency will 
fall
on deaf ears.
In the volume above referred to, BXNTAAM makes this view 
of'
the function of the jury still more striking by an analysis of 
the dis-
tinction between civil and criminal trials. "The beneficial effects 
of
jury-trial are produced in a different shape" he says, "in 
the civil
branch and in the penal. In the civil branch, it is by applying 
a
bridle to arbitrary power in the hands of the judge; in the 
penal
branch, as we have seen, contributing to infuse weakness into 
the
body of the law". Such weakness is necessary in order that the 
rights
of those affected by the laws should not be sacrificed in the interests
of those who make them. By the vote of a single juror the 
hand
of the law, when it is deemed to operate oppressively, may 
be par-
alysed. Individual security is thus exalted above governmental 
power,
and it may well be that the jury systeln has in this way perpetuated
2principles of Judicial Procedure, Chap. XXIII.
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the ideals of personal liberty which have now become recognized as
the most illustrious product of English political and legal struggles.But times have changed, and the government itself is now under
the absolute control of the people. The judges, if appointed, are
selected by the agents of the people, and if elected are selected -by
the people directly. The need for the jury as a political weapon of
defense has been steadily diminishing for a hundred years, until now
the jury must find some other justification for its continuance.
We are thus brought to a consideration of the second and sole
remaining purpose served by the petit jury, namely, the trial of
issues of fact. If this is now its only considerable function, how
can it survive the weakness which is certain to attend the perform-
ance of difficult duties by untrained and irresponsible persons?
With its characteristic resourcefulness the common law provided
a corrective. The judges undertook to give the jury the benefit of
their experience and skill by advising them in difficult cases respect-
ing the weight and effect of the evidence. This never went to the
length of obligatory instructions on the facts. That would have
killed the jury as an institution. But the judges did not hesitate to
tell the jury what they believed the evidence had shown, and the
jury did not resent it, for it was advice, not a command, and the jury
were always expressly informed that if it did not appeal to them as
sound they were at liberty to disregard it.
So universally was the propriety and expediency of this doctrine
recognized in England that few cases are to be' found where it has
been questioned. But whenever the point has been raised the rule as
stated has been unqualifiedly affirmed. Thus in the Court of Ex-
chequer, PAInx, B., said, in Taylor v. Ashton,3 which was an action
for deceit, "The learned judge told the jury * * * * * that he did
not think what was proved amounted to fraud * * * * * but this
was no matter of law, it was a mere observation on the fact * * * *
And accordingly it appears the learned judge said, 'After all , it is a
question for you to decide, not for me? * * * * * But looking
at the mode in which that was left to the jury, and considering that
the learned judge was not discussing it as a matter of law * * * * *
we cannot say that any wrong observation on a matter of fact, in
which we could not concur, is a ground for granting a new trial, if
it was left as a question of fact for the jury."
In the Cohimon Pleas, in Dawidson v. Stanley,' TINDA,, C. J., said:
"The whole objection amounts to this,-that the opinion of the judge
3 (1843) i M. & w. 401.
4 (1841) 2 Man. & Gr. 721.
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was delivered in favor of the defendant. I think it is no objection
that a judge lets the jury know the impression which the evidence
has made upon his own mind." And COITmAN, J., said: "The
learned judge seems to have made strong observations; but no
stronger than he was justified in making. A large mass of evidence
had been given which, though of little weight itself, was of such a
nature as might mislead the jury."
In the King's Bench, in Salarte v. Melville,
5 Lord TFNT.RmrN,
C. J., said: "We are all agreed, however, that notwithstanding I did
intimate to the jury my opinion upon the subject, yet as I left
it to them to exercise their own discretion, and to draw their own
conclusion from the evidence, we ought not to disturb this verdict."
In Canada the same rule is liberally enforced. In Lowenourg,
Harris & Co. v. WooleyO complaint was made that the judge had
taken the decision of a question of fact away from the jury, but
the Chief Justice speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada said,
"No doubt the learned judge, in his long and exhaustive charge, did
strongly comment on the evidence, but that he has a perfect right
to do, and I must add, considering the nature of the case and of
the evidence adduced, I should have been surprised if the learned "
judge had not spoken forcibly."
The manifest advantages of such a rule of practice have fre-
quently been pointed out. Thus, so eminent a writer as judge Pitt
TAY-LoR, in his work on EvnmNc , says that "it may well be doulited
whether, in the great majority of instances, it would not.promote the
real interests of justice, if the judge were temperately to state to
the jury what opinions he has formed respecting the merits of the
case, and the mode by which he had arrived at his conclusions.
The jury would still have the undisputed power of deciding the
question as they thought fit, but they would have the advantage of
being advised by a man no more liable than themselves to prejtfdice
or partiality, whose long experience in courts of justice must of
necessity have rendered him far more competent than they can be to
unravel the tangled threads of conflicting testimony." 
7
FoRsYTH, in defending the jury as an institution in civil cases
against the criticism that many wrong verdicts result from the ig-
norance and prejudice of jurymen, doubts the frequency of such
miscarriages of justice because of the double safeguard of judicial
counsel and advice and the granting of new trials. "The presiding
5 (1827) 7 Barn. & Cress. 430.
e (x895) 25 Can. S. C. 5!.
7z Taylor on Evidence (8th Eng. Ed.) § 25.
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judge," he says, "has, by the tendency and bias of the remarks
which he makes in summing up, the means of influencing and
guiding them to a right result; and they have generally the good
sense to avail themselves of all the help afforded by his perspi-
cacity." 8
So much for the development of the English jury. Turning to
the United States we find a curious reaction from the sensible and
practical views outlined above. At the time when the American
Colonies separated themselves from England, the rights of the people
were by no means secure against the encroachments of government.
The jury was still regarded as an indispensible political weapon, and
when the new government was set up here, it was inevitable that a
constitutional bill of rights should be adopted securing forever the
right of trial by jury. This was no more than a reaffirmance of the
constitutional rights enjoyed by Englishmen since Magna Charta,
and was not inconsistent with the continuance of that aid and advice
which English juries were in the habit of receiving from the judges.
But the American people went farther. Perhaps their experience
as inhabitants of colonies, whose remoteness served as a cloak for
tyranny and oppression, made them more sensitive to the possibilities
lurking in the judicial prerogative. At any rate, they conceived the
idea of prohibiting judges from advising juries in regard to the
facts. As early as the year 1796 this novel doctrine found its way
into the Constitution of Tennessee, in the following language,--
"The judges of the superior and inferior courts shall not charge
juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony
and -declare the law." 9 In 1822 a similar provision was enacted by
the legislature of Mississippi, which was repealed in I83O, but re-
appeared again in an even more drastic form in the statutes of
186o.10 In 1836 Arkansas int'roduced the Tennessee provision into
its Constitution." The next year North Carolina enacted a statute
still more explicit in its prohibitory language,--"No judge, in giving
a charge to the petit jury, either in a civil or criminal action, shall
give an opinion whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proven, such
matter being the true office and province of the jury." 
1 2
The movement was thus indigenous to the South. It was nearly
fifty years before the first Northern state, Illinois, took it up,13 Then
s History of Trial by Jury, p. 44x.
9Const. of 1796, Art. S, § S.10R. C. 1822, Ch. 13, § x44; Hutchinson's Miss. Code, Ch. 61, Art. z; R. C. t88o,
1 2714.
1 Const. of x836, Art. 7, § 12.
1R. S. 1837, Ch. 39, § 136.
3 R. S. 1845, § 28, p. 427.
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two more Southern states adopted it,--Georgia in i85o,14 and Texas
in I853.15 Georgia went so far as to prohibit courts from intimating
opinions even in equity cases where juries were called in. During
the next thirty-five years fourteen more states enacted statutes or
adopted constitutional provisions embodying, in various phrases, this
restriction on the power of judges. These were in Massachusetts in
i86o,18 California in 1862,17 Nevada in 1864,18 Oregon in 1865, 9
Colorado in 1867,20 South Carolina in 1868,21 Maine in 1874,22 North
Dakota in 1877, 23 Florida in 1877,2" New Mexico in 1880,23 Arizonain 887, '20 South Dakota in 1887,2" Indian Territory in 1889,21 and
Washington in 1889.2' That marked the end of the movement toward
legislative and constitutional restrictions on the powers of courts in
charging juries.30 It will be seen that, although most prevalent in the
South, it was confined by no geographical lines and restricted to no
single period of time. Of the twenty-one states and territories which
adopted it, eleven were Southern, four belonged to the Pacific Coast
group, two were in New England and four were in the Central West;
and the period covered was almost a hundred years. Of the forty-
nine states and territories comprising the contiguous portion of the
United States, twenty-eight have never adopted such legislation.
3
But while considerably less than half the states have enacted
legislation on this subject, the courts in about half of the remaining
states have by judicial decision adopted the same restriction,
3 2 so that
a
4
Acts of x85o; now appears as § 4663, Code 1911.
% Acts of x853; now appears as § 1317, Sayles' Civ. Stat.
I$ G. S., z86o, Ch. x25, § 5.
1 %Proposed in x861, ratified in z862 as an amendment to the Const. of 1849.
13 Const. VI, § 12.
"sActs of 1865, see Hill's L. 1887, § 200.
21R. S. 1867, Ch. 7o, § 28; repealed by amendment, G. S. z883, § 168.
21 Const. of 1868, Art. 4, § 26.
2
2Acts of 1874, see R. S., 1903, Ch. 84, § 97.
sC. C. P. 1877, § 248.
24
Acts of 1877, see G. S., r9o6, § 2496.
2 1
Acts of i88o, Ch. 6, § 23.
2 R. S. 1887, § 775.
21 C. L. 1887, § 5048.
28 25 U. S. Stat. at Large, c. 333, p. 783, extending rules of practice of Arkansas
to the Indian Territory.
= Const. IV, § 16.
30 While this and other general statements respecting legislation are believed to be
substantially correct, they are subject to error, for different collections of statutes
are so differently arranged and so differently and often so poorly indexed that it
is quite possible to overlook provisions of this nature.
3 Compare 2 Thompson on Trials, § 2280, which states: "By statute and, In
some states also by constitutional prbvisions, in almost every state and territory,
judges are expressly forbidden to charge the jury on questions of fact."
2 Alabama: Andrews v. State, x59 Ala. 14.
'Indiana: Killian v. Eigenmann, 57 Ind. 480.
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the rule is now actually in force in two-thirds of the American jur-
isdictions. Only the federal courts and a minority of the state courts
which were unaffected by statute have remained true to the common
law.33
It is hard to account for this widespread departure from the well-
settled principles which have always governed the jury trial. The
courts which have judicially created the doctripe, like the legislatures
or the people who have enacted the statutes, doubtless did so in the
belief they were preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury. But
they have nowhere, so far as the writer's researches have shown,
considered the question in a broad way, nor have they, in most cases,
indicated an appreciation of the fact that they were announcing a
doctrine unfamiliar to the common law. Without argument, with-
out examination, without authority they have simply held that an ex-
pression of opinion of the facts by the judge invades the province
of the jury, and it is therefore error. A few courts have gone far-
ther and justified the restriction on the powers of the judge on the
ground that the jury is notoriously so under the influence of the
judge that any intimation of opinion on his part would be tanta-
mount to a withdrawal of the case upon that point from the consider-
ation of the jury." But such a view is either unfair to juries or it
points out so fatal a lack of independent judgment upon their part
Iowa: State. v. Philpot, 97 Iowa, 365.
Kansas: Heithecker v. Fitzhugh, 41 Kan. So.
Louisiana: Riviere v. McCormick, 14 La. Ann. i39.
Maryland: United Railways & Elec. Co. v. Carneal, iso Md. 2ir.
Michigan: McDuff v. Detroit Journal Co., 84 Mich. i, departing from the earlier
contrary rule stated in Sheehan v. Barry, 27 Mich. 217.
Missouri: Webb v. Baldwin, x65 Mo. App. 240.
Montana: Wastil v. Montana Union Railroad Co., 17 Mont. 213.
Nebraska: Kleutsch v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 72 Nebr. 75.
Ohio: Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Hedges, x5 Ohio C. C. 254.
Oklahoma: Kirk v. Territory, io Okla. 46.
Virginia: Whitelaw's Ex'r v. Whitelaw, 83 Va. 40.
lVest Virginia: Harman & Crockett v. Maddy Bros., 57 W. Va. 6o.
Wisconsin: Buyington v. Merrill, 112 Wis. 211, departing from the earlier contrary
rule state in Ketcham v. Fbert, 33 Wis. 6xi.
m United States: St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. v. Vickers, 122 U. S. 36o.
Connecticut: Banks v. Railway & Lighting Co., 79 Conn. x16.
Minnesota: Bonndss v. Felsing, 97 Minn. 227.
New Hampshire: Flanders v. Colby, 28 N. H. 34.
New Jersey: State v. Hummer, 73 N. J. L. 714.
New York: N. Y. Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Walden, 12 Johns. 513.
Pennsylvania: Leibig v. Steiner, 94. Pa. St. 466.
Rhode Island: State v. Lynott, 5 R. I. 295.
Utahf. People v. Lee, 2 Utah, 441.
Vermont: Rowell v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 688.
1 Cronkhite v. Dickerson, 51 Mich. 177; McMinn v. WVhelen, 27 Cal. 3oo.
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as to disqualify them entirely for the duty they are sworn to per-
form.
As long- as the ultimate decision rests with the jury there can be
no serious encroachment 'by the judge. His advice will be taken
when it appears to -be justified by the evidence; otherwise it will fail
of effect. The jury will be quick to see and resent any attempt on
the part of the judge to be unfair to either party, and the concur-
rence of the jury in the advice of the court will be good evidence that
his advice was sound. Even so radical an antagonist of judicial
usurpation as BNTHAm recognized this when he said :--"In so far
as upon what he does or says depends the decision given by the
jury-only in so far as what he does and says, has in their eyes the
appearance of justice, can he hope to exercise any influence upon the
decision they are about to pronounce." 35
The doctrine that a final decision on the facts from the judge
alone is entirely proper and just in a so-called equity case, while the
slightest intimation of the court's opinion on any part of the facts
is a monstrous and fatal error in a so-called law case, is a phase of
legal legerdemain which ought not to be perpetuated. There -is no
esoteric virtue in the chancellor which fails in the judge. Facts are
facts, whether they are investigated on the law or the equity side of
the court.
But aside from the obvious advantages which the jury would gain
from the impartial advice of the judge based upon his experience,
skill and technical training, the full recognition not only of the
right but the duty of the judge to advise the jury on the facts,
would produce amazing results in diminishing the costs, delays and
technicalities of jury trials. Among the most striking of these ad-
vantages, the following may be named:
i. It would reduce the time, strain. and scandal in empanelling
juries. Nowhere in the English speaking world are there such exhi-
bitions of judicial ataxia in obtaining juries as in the United States.
Why should a judge sit helpless for days and weeks while lawyers
wrangle and struggle over the selection of a jury? Why should the
court be paralysed at the whim of contentious counsel, piling up ex-
pense on the taxpayers, congesting d6ckets, delaying justice, and
bringing the law into disrepute? Chiefly because the jury is an
irresponsible and uncontrolled subject for the lawyer's manipulation.
In many cases he does not try to get an impartial jury, but a jury
which he can handle. He wants jurors having prejudices which he
can play upon, sympathies which he can appeal to; foibles which he
"Principles of judicial Procedure, § 4.
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can capitalize for his own profit. He investigates their personal
histories, their political inclinations, their religious affiliations, their
social habits. All this would tend to disappear at once if the judge
were a real adviser to the jury. The appeals to passion, sympathy
and prejudice, the distortion of the evidence, the confusing of the
issues, the clever and insidious emphasis upon the things which
should not count, would lose their potency. In the face of a clear,
dispassionate and candid analysis of the merits of the case by an
impartial judge, the tricks and artifices would fail; the worse would
not appear the better reason; the jury, taken into the confidence of
the court and treated like reasonable and self-respecting men,
would feel the dignity and responsibility of their position. They
would be what the law contemplates,--impartial jurors. But such
a jury can be obtained without the long delay and interminable
challenges.. If the judge by his advice can counteract the efforts to
prevent a decision on the merits, such efforts will cease. This has
been the experience in England and her colonies. Juries are quickly
obtained and do their duty well. Justice RIDImLL of the Supreme
Court of Ontario recently said: "I have never, in thirty years' ex-
perience, seen it take more than half an hour to get a jury even in
a murder case, and never but once heard a juryman asked a ques-
tion." 36
2. It would facilitatethe introduction of evidence. The science
of special pleading'is usually pointed to as the climax of legal re-
finement, but the science of evidence pays a much greater tribute
to the microscopic discrimination of the legal mind. It is an elabo-
rate and comprehensive system for excluding evidence from the
jury, based upon the fundamental idea that the jury cannot be
trusted with all the facts of the case, but only with such as the
courts think are not likely to mislead. Fearful that the jury will
draw false conclusions or will become confused in regard to the
issues submitted to it, the law devises a protective scheme which
is so complex and so infinitely refined that the labors of a life time
are hardly sufficient to master it. It is a labyrinth set with pitfalls
at every turn. No lawyer fully understands it; no judge can ac-
curately administer if Errors in the admissions and exclusion of
evidence are not only common but inevitable, and they bring with
them appeals, reversals and re-trials. No such rules are necessary
to protect the judge when he tries the facts, for he is deemed to
have sufficient knowledge, judgment and experience to understand
the probative force of whatever is presented to him. But the juror
3162 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 17, 32.
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is presumed to be an easy prey to illegal influences and suggestions,
and if he might have gone wrong by reason of such an error it is
usually presumed that he did go wrong.
But if the case is carefully analysed for the benefit of the jury
by the judge, and the force and effect of the various parts of the
evidence is fully explained to the jury, and the judge suggests to
them what .appear to him to be proper conclusions to draw from it,
is not the chance of the jury being misled practically eliminated?
By a perusal of the" judge's advice and suggestions, it can readily
be seen whether the case in its substantial aspects was clearly laid
before the jury for decision. - If it was, no harm has been done,
for cautions from the judge are a reasonably reliable corrective for
violations of rules of evidence.
A recent American observer of court practice in England has
suggested that much of the speed and efficiency with which the
English courts dispatch business may be traced to the operation of
this rule.' In speaking of the tendency there shown to ignore many
of the technical rules of evidence, he says :--"The real cause of this
tolerance will be found in the fact that both sides rely on the in-
fluence of the judge to eliminate from the minds of the jury the
effect of evidence wrongly introduced." 37
3. It would enable the jdge to exercise much more effective
control over the conduct of the trial. The prevailing American rule
prohibits any remarks from the judge, as well during the prior
course of the trial as during the giving of .instructions, which in-
timate any opinion he may hold as to whether any fact has -or has
not been established, as to whether any piece of evidence is entitled
to much or little weight, and as to whether any witness or class of
witnesses is to be deemed more or less credible. Almost every
ruling he is called upon to make during the trial relates directly
or indirectly to the evidence. In just so far as he is an active
participant in the trial he is likely, therefore, by word or act, to
give the jury some inkling as to his own impressions. A word
used, a suggestive phrase dropped, an inadvertent failure to properly
balance his statements, even a perfectly valid reason given for a
ruling, might reveal an opinion. In every sound he utters there
lurks the possibility of reversible error. Is it strange, then, that the
judge inclines to hold himself aloof from the contest, to sit as an
umpire or moderator rather than as a participant in the proceeding,
to let things take their own course as far as he can, and to throw
87 Leaming: A Philadelphia Lawyer in the London Courts, p. 103.
C:
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the responsibility for a proper decision of the case upon the parties;
the lawyers and the jury?
The "Philadelphia Lawyer", Mr. LrAMING, already quoted, points
out the striking contrast between the current ptactice in this regard
in the English and American courts., "The judges", he says, "take
a larger part in trials than in most American courts-a practice which
has much to commend it, and which is increasing on this side of the
water. An American lawyer will say, 'I tried a case before Judge
So-and-so'-an English barrister says: 'I conducted a case which
Lord So-and-so tried'. The English judge restrains counsel, often
examines the witnesses, and his personal influence is quite openly
exerted to guide the jury and cause them to avoid absurdities and
extremes. Yet, the crucial questions of fact really to be deter-
mined--of which there are usually but one or two-are left abso-
lutely to the juries unfettered decision." 0s
A similar situation, to a somewhat less marked degree, exists .in
our own Federal Courts, where the salutary rule of the common
law is maintained in its purity, and the judge is free to give aid and
advice to the jury and to take an active part in helping to make
his court in fact what it is in name,-a court of justice.
4. It would simplify the tcsk of instructing the Jury on the laz.4
It is very difficult to prepare a set of instructions which will not
be suggestive of matters of fact on the one hand, or be too abstract
on the other. The judge must "give the jury the law, but he must
not intimate opinions on the facts; and yet the rules of law which he
gives must be concrete and applicable to the precise facts in evi-
dence. The court must not assume the existence of any contro-,
verted fact, must not put in doubt any uncontroverted fact, must
not emphasize by special reference, nor minimize by silence, any
particular facts, must not call special attention to particular wit-
nesses, must not use ambiguous forms of grammatical expressioiA
which may or may not carry suggestive inferences as to the exist-
ence of facts. The whole doctrine of cautionary instructions is in
a state of chaos because of the possible tendency of such instructions
to transgress the rule we are considering.
In a recent examination in Practice in a large law school, several
instructions were given which had been held fatally bad by American
Supreme Courts as unwarranted inroads upon the province of the
jury, and yet sixty per cent. of the students, using their utmost in-
genuity, were unable to discover anything wrong with them. Prob-
ably the juries who received these instructions never even sus-
"Learning: A Philadelphia La~vyer in the London Courts, p. zoz.
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pected the presence of the elements which caused the cases to be
reversed, bitt there was a possibility that they might have inter-
iireted them as reflecting upon the weight of the evidence, and to
preserve the province of the jury inviolate it was deemed necessary
to have the cases tried again.
But suppose the court should be permitted to really explain and
elucidate the evidence for the jury's benefit. Most of these baffling
rules and restrictions would at once disappear. There -would still
be the possibility that inadvertent phrases in the instructions might
be constructed as binding charges on the law instead of mere opin-
ions on the facts, but in the face of a sound analysis and commentary
on the evidence, showing fully the problems which were presented
for the jury to solve, the liability to error would be reduced to a
minimum.
5. It would reduce the frequency of resort to that expensive
rem edy for bad verdicts,--the New Trial.
. Some of the grounds for new trial are not based upon the con-
duct of the case in open court. Such are disqualification of jurors,
accident or surprise, misconduct of the party or jury outside the
court room, and newly discovered evidence. But others are based
upon the manner in which the trial was conducted and upon the
justness of the verdict as related to the evidence. Thus, the ad-
mission of proper evidence, the misconduct of counsel in improperly
appealing to passion or prejudice or in bringing to the attention of
the jury facts which are not proper for their consideration,
excessive or insufficient verdicts, and verdicts which are against the
weight of the evidence, all constitute grounds of this nature. We
kave already considered the salutary influence which an untram-
meled court can properly exercise in correcting errors in the ad-
niission of evidence and in the conduct of counsel, without a resort
to the delay, expense and annoyance of a new trial. But the same
results would follow in the case of excessive or perverse verdicts.
The rule which forbids the court to comment upon the weight of
ihe evidence is based upon a narrow view of the division of func-
tions between court and jury. The court responds to questions of
law, the jury to questions of fact. It is, therefore, no more logical,
it is asserted, for the court to advise the jury on the facts than
for the jury to advise the court upon the law. Accordingly, no
suggestions from the court must touch upon matters of fact. But
the doctrine of new trials "based upon perverse verdicts sufficiently
shows that the jury are not exclusive judges of the facts. Even if
they are flattered to their faces by being told so, their exclusive
THE INEFFICIEINCY OF THE JURY
jurisdiction is repudiated behind their backs when their verdicts
are set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence.
"'While it is the exclusive province of the jury to find the facts,"
says the Supreme Court of California, a state whose constitution
prohibits comments on the evidence, "it is nevertheless one of the
most important requirements of the trial judge to see to it that this
function of the jury is intelligently and justly exercised. In this
respect, while he cannot competently interfere with or control the
jury in passing upon the evidence, he nevertheless exercises a very
salutary supervisory power over their verdict. In the exercise of
that power, he should always satisfy himself that the evidence, as
a whole is sufficient to sustain the verdict found, and, if in hi§
sound judgment it is not, he should unhesitatingly say so, and set
the verdict aside." 89 And Mr. Justice BmNTF R speaking for the
state court upon which he formerly sat, observes that the trial
court "has the same opportunity as the jury for forming a just
estimate of the credence to be placed in the various witnesses,
and, if it appears to him that the jury have found against the
weight of evidence, it is his imperative duty to set the verdict
aside." 40
In other words, the jury are not the exclusive judges of the
weight of the evidence. They are exclusive judges if they de-
cide right; but not if they decide wrong, and the court has the
final decision. Of course it may be answered that the court's
decision is not final, because the only effect of its action -is to send
the case back to another jury. But practically there would be
little use in going before another jury with the same evidence,
if held by the court insufficient, for the case would be ship-
wrecked on the same rock as before; and if the verdict is set
aside as excessive, it would be a foolish lawyer who would tempt
providence by asking another jury for the same amount.
If, then, the court has the power, for all practical purposes,
to prevent parties from obtaining judgments upon perverse ver-
dicts, why should it not have the power to help juries to avoid
such verdicts. Why must the court sit mute, allow the verdict to
be rendered without a woral of warning, and then destroy it? A
supervising architect does not stand silent and allow a building to
go up in a manner he cannot approve, and when it is completed at
much cost, order it demolished and built over from the beginning.
To attempt it would be to prove himself crazy. An executive
'9People v. Knutte, rix Cal. 453.
40Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kunkel, 17 Kan. 172.
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having the veto power -on legislation, if he felt any interest in ob-
taining needed -laws, would not refrain from all comment upon
iending bills until after the legislature had completed its task and
adjourned, and then veto its work and force another legislature to
attack the same -problem without any information as to why the
veto had been exercised. To do so would be to prove himself a
political ignoramus. And yet the American people, who pride them-
selves on their efficiency and common sense, require or permit their
courts to be run on just this plan.
Many are the complaints against modem procedure, and many
are the remedies proposed, but the writer believes that no single re-
form would have so wide-reaching and wholesome an effect in
promoting the efficiency of courts and improving the quality of jus-
tice obtainable there, as a return to the sensible and effective rule
of the common law permitting, and in its spirit requiring, that
judges should generously aid juries in reaching just conclusions on
matters of fact.
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